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An inquest heard how Jodie Anne Jose had a history of depression and had been on anti-depressants for six months before her death
A young woman researched 'how to die painlessly' on her smartphone before committing suicide, an inquest heard.
Jodie Anne Jose, 22, had a history of depression when she went missing from her home earlier this year.
Friends and family launched a frantic search for Jodie as police immediately deemed her a 'high risk missing person '.
Jodie, from Chelmsford, Essex, was later found lifeless in her Ford Fiesta parked outside a railway station.
The young bank worker was rushed to hospital, but later pronounced dead.
Essex Coroners' Court in Chelmsford heard how she was plagued by depression and had been on anti-depressants for six months following an earlier self-harm attempt.
Jodie went missing from her home on March 4, before friends found her ten miles away outside Great Bentley railway station at around midnight.
She was rushed to Colchester General Hospital but was pronounced dead at 2.10am after efforts to resuscitate her were unsuccessful.
At the time of her death, friends took to the social media site to pay tribute to the "kind hearted and beautiful girl".
Megan Smith said: "You were amazing Jodie, so kind and caring there wasn't a bad bone in your beautiful little body. I miss you so much already."
Recording a verdict of suicide, Essex chief coroner Caroline Beasley-Murray said: "I have come to the very sad conclusion that she intended to take her own life.
"I have to be sure that is the highest standard of proof, beyond all reasonable doubt.
"Having regard to how she was over the last few months and her previous attempt and having regard to the planning, really that she seems to have intended this."
The court heard evidence from Inspector Paul Butcher who concluded there was no third party involvement or foul play to make him think there were any suspicious circumstances surrounding Jodie's death.
Insp Butcher praised the efforts of Jodie's family in organising an extensive search for her through Facebook .
Jodie had researched how to die painlessly on a phone and written about depression in her diary (Photo: SWNS)
Jodie's sister Stacey Saville said her sibling had written about her depression in her diary and had researched how to die painlessly on an old phone she kept hidden.
She told the hearing: "Jodie had an old phone, she used that because she thought none would see it."
Speaking to Jodie's family Mrs Beasley-Murray said: "She clearly was much loved and had a lot going for her but again I want to express my condolences, I hope you remember all the happy memories of her."
She told them that their love and support for Jodie throughout her life really "shines through".
Universal education for women is not in the interest of men. For some women, a good education is OK. For the majority, it is unneeded.
With free speech, it's like that: You can make any offending remarks about white men, and the mainstream media and mainstream opinion will applaud you. You can't say anything negative about feminism. Feminism is sacrosanct. Fuck it.
Terry R. Haveman 3961 Shinn Street New York, NY 10004
International terrorism poses one of the greatest strategic challenges in the modern age as groups have become able to cross borders and carry out operations globally; and has gained a renewed focus since the events of September 11th 2001. It is possible that terrorists might attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction which could then be used anywhere in the world. The term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ itself is a relatively new term and normally encompasses chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons (CBRN). These are incredibly varied in their effects as well as their availability, and whilst terrorist groups might want to acquire such “weapons of terror”, the effectiveness of such weapons compared to conventional explosives may be disputed. Aum Shinrikyo for example is probably the most famous terrorist group to acquire and use weapons that would now be classified as WMDs, but was only able to do so due to its considerable financial resources, and even then “failed in all 10 of its biological weapons attacks” whilst the Sarin gas attack in 1995 caused roughly the same number of fatalities as “the average Palestinian suicide bomber attack.” In this essay I will examine the component parts of the term weapons of mass destruction (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) individually to assess the credibility of international terrorists using such weapons. I will show that although it is credible that terrorists would want to use such weapons and may attempt to do so in the future, conventional explosives have thus far proven more effective and in my opinion, it is far more likely that conventional terrorism will remain at the forefront of terrorist tactics.
Chemical terrorism is a potentially devastating form of WMD terrorism and certainly presents a credible threat to the international community. Toxic chemical agents such as chlorine and phosgene (which were first used as chemical weapons during the First World War) are found in many industry sectors and can easily be acquired and adapted for use in chemical weapons, although these devices will not be as effective as nerve agents, which are much more difficult to produce and require sophisticated laboratories to do so. Even so these weapons carry the potential to cause large amounts of casualties, although the vast majority of these would most likely be injuries rather than fatalities, and can be used effectively to create fear and encourage panic. Hamas is just one group that has pursued chemical weapons in the past, often lacing shrapnel used in suicide bombs with chemical agents, such as in December 2001 where “nails and bolts packed into explosives detonated…at the Ben-Yehuda pedestrian mall in Jerusalem were soaked in rat poison” in order to kill those survivors of the initial blast who were hit by shrapnel, and they have also attempted to acquire and use cyanide in attacks. So far however the effect of these chemical weapons seems limited and have been used in conjunction with conventional explosives rather than separately. Chemical weapons are also dependent on various factors including temperature and humidity, and when dispersed outside they become unpredictable due to wind conditions. In 1990 for example the Tamil Tigers attacked a Sri Lanka Air Force fortification using chlorine gas which was released to drift over the fort, and succeeded in injuring over 60 government soldiers and enabled the Tamil Tigers to take the fort, but then drifted back over their own positions. These chemical agents are rarely particularly effective, and it is noted that the Tamil Tigers used the chlorine gas simply because it was a weapon that they had to hand at the time and it suited a particular battlefield need. As a result terrorist organisations may try to utilise the potential of more deadly chemical weapons such as nerve agents, which I shall now discuss.
The cultivation of nerve agents such as Sarin or VX, is significantly more expensive than the procurement of other more basic agents, and requires considerable amount of expertise. Despite this it is still credible that terrorists could make use of such weapons as they have done in the past, most famously perhaps the Tokyo subway attack in 1995. Aum Shinrikyo had already carried out an attack using Sarin gas in 1994 in the city of Matsumoto, targeting three judges hearing “a lawsuit over a real-estate dispute in which Aum Shinrikyo was the defendant” and which they were likely to lose, subsequently killing 7 and wounding approximately 500. Following this, the Aum Shinrikyo cult group (now known as Aleph) carried out possibly the most successful chemical terrorist attack in 1995, releasing Sarin on the Tokyo subway system and causing 13 deaths and injuring approximately 6,300. In a subsequent raid on Satyan 7, a “supposed shrine to the Hindu god Shiva”, it was found that the building “housed a moderately large-scale chemical weapons production facility” which was designed to produce thousands of kilograms of Sarin a year, although at the time of the Tokyo subway attack it was no longer in service. This attack was the most devastating chemical attack by a terrorist group, and yet other attacks carried out using conventional explosives have been more effective, such as the bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 where 301 people were killed and 5,000 were injured. It is unlikely that a chemical attack will occur again on such a large scale due to the amount of expense involved, as Aum Shinrikyo remains at this time “the only group that had the financing and the motivation to create or obtain a true military-grade CW agent”. It is also important to note that Aum Shinrikyo is an apocalyptic group, and it is relatively unlikely that a more politically motivated group, even one such as Al-Qaeda would carry out a mass casualty chemical attack. The threat of a small-scale chemical attack is very credible with the availability of resources but the effectiveness of such a weapon would be fairly limited, and would actually probably be less effective than a conventional attack.
Bioterrorism is a very real threat to the international community today as it can be both disruptive as well as destructive. There are many different forms of Biological weapons that could be used, “Some are contagious and can spread rapidly in a population, while others, including anthrax and ricin, infect and kill only those who are directly exposed.” This diversity in effects can enable a group to carry out either targeted or indiscriminate attacks depending on their goals but both types, if carried out correctly, have the capability to majorly disrupt the targeted state or region. A biological attack is a much more realistic threat than a nuclear attack largely because “Unlike nuclear arms, dangerous germs are cheap and easy to come by”, whilst their effects on people can potentially reach the same scale as a nuclear bomb. For a more disruptive but by no means less devastating attack, a group could potentially target crops and livestock, disrupting a state’s food supply and economy. Biological warfare itself has been in use for centuries; in the Siege of Caffa in 1346 for example the Tartar forces, who were suffering from an outbreak of plague, ordered the infected corpses loaded onto trebuchets and hurled into the city in an attempt to kill all its inhabitants. In the Second World War the British planned to drop 5 million linseed cakes contaminated with anthrax spores into Germany which would then be consumed first by cattle, and then by Germans who subsequently ate the infected animals, whilst simultaneously creating a food shortage for the surviving population through the death of the remaining cattle. This attack (known as Operation Vegetarian) was never put into action however Gruinard Island, the island on which the cakes were tested, was only cleared of contamination in 1990 which suggests the possible long-term effects such an attack could cause. I shall now examine different types of biological weapons as well as possible future threats.
Perhaps the most well-known biological agent that has been used as a weapon is anthrax, a disease caused by bacteria called Bacillus anthracis, largely because of the relative ease with which it can be cultivated and the various ways it can cause infection which each cause different symptoms (inhalation, contact with a break in the skin, or ingestion of anthrax-tainted meat). Causing infection on a large scale with anthrax is however incredibly difficult. This is perhaps best shown by Aum Shinrikyo’s failed anthrax attack in 1993, in which members of the group attempted to aerosolise a “liquid suspension of Bacillus anthracis in an attempt to cause an inhalational anthrax epidemic”, and in the process create the conditions for another world war. The attack caused a foul odour and some minor cases of appetite-loss; nausea and vomiting, but failed to infect a single person, and it was only discovered that it had been an attack using anthrax during an investigation following the Tokyo subway station attack in March 1995. The most successful attack using anthrax was perhaps the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States which occurred shortly after the events of September 11th. The attacks caused 22 cases of anthrax infection of which “Eleven of these were inhalational cases, of whom 5 died; [and] 11 were cutaneous cases (7 confirmed, 4 suspected).” Although the attack did not cause mass-casualties, it did cause major disruption and caused the temporary closure of the government mail service, as well as widespread fear of finding anthrax spores in the mail. There is also the threat of terrorists using the Botulinum toxin, one of the most deadly toxins known, which “poses a major bioweapon threat because of its extreme potency and lethality; its ease of production, transport, and misuse”. To cause more widespread damage terrorists could attempt to utilise contagious diseases such as the Ebola virus or even possibly avian influenza, and there is evidence to suggest that Aum Shinrikyo did at least contemplate the possibility of using the Ebola virus as a biological weapon. The use of contagious diseases in particular could become a major tactic for terrorist organisations in the future as it has the potential to cause widespread mass-casualties. The relative ease in the cultivation of agents such as anthrax and Botulinum, as well as the widespread and possibly transnational effects that contagious viruses could cause, makes bioterrorism a credible threat to the international community. However at this time it would appear that it would be extremely difficult to cause a crisis such as an epidemic and would probably therefore be limited to small scale attacks designed to cause more fear than casualties.
Radiological terrorism is perhaps one of the most credible threats to the international community, although arguably is also the least effective. The most credible use of radiological terrorism would probably be through the use of a radiological weapon, otherwise known as a ‘Dirty Bomb’ or a radiological dispersal device (RDD), which is designed to kill or injure “through the initial blast of the conventional explosive, and by airborne radiation and contamination (hence the term “dirty”).” They are realistically more weapons of mass disruption rather than destruction, but their capacity to create both large scale casualties and mass panic cannot be underestimated. A dirty bomb is a more realistic terrorist threat than a nuclear bomb largely because of the relative ease in its manufacture, as it is simply a conventional explosive with a radioactive isotope packed inside it; when the explosive detonates the isotope is dispersed over a large area thereby causing contamination over a wide area. There are a vast number of radioactive isotopes that could be used to make a dirty bomb and many of them are in the public domain, one example being caesium-137, a radioactive isotope that has widespread uses including certain cancer treatments. There have been two cases of terrorists attempting or threatening to use RDDs, though neither was successful in being carried out. The first occurred in 1995 in Moscow, when Chechen separatists buried a package containing Caesium-137 in Izmaylovsky Park, announcing it to the press in order to prove their ability to create and if necessary use a radiological weapon. The second instance of radiological terrorism was in December 1998, when the Chechen Secret Service discovered a dirty bomb “consisting of a land mine combined with radioactive materials”, which was quickly disarmed.
The relative ease in which a dirty bomb could be manufactured makes it far more likely than a nuclear bomb, however there are other possible forms of radiological terrorism that are perhaps less likely but potentially more dangerous, although there are no actual records of them occurring, including distribution in ventilation systems or the use of aircraft to powdered or aerosol forms of radioactive material. It is also theoretically possible that a terrorist organisation may attempt to attack a nuclear power station, following which a large enough explosion may allow the mass dispersion of a large amount of nuclear material, although safeguards and security arrangements should be able to deal with this threat. Although a successful radiological terrorist attack has not yet occurred, there are examples of the effects that radioactive materials have on humans, leading to increased fear about the possibility of attack. In September 1999 as just one example two thieves attempted to steal a container of radioactive materials from a chemical factory in Chechnya, but after half an hour one of the suspects died and the other collapsed, “even though each held the container for only a few minutes.” The threat to the international community from radiological terrorism is fairly credible given the relative ease in procurement and manufacture, and there is speculation that Al-Qaeda may have succeeded in creating a dirty bomb due to evidence found by British Intelligence agents and weapons researchers in 2003, although the device itself has not been found.
Nuclear terrorism is perhaps the most feared, and most unlikely, form of WMD Terrorism facing the world today. It has been argued that with increased amounts of uranium and particularly plutonium in circulation, due to more emphasis being placed on nuclear power, it is becoming far more likely that terrorists could acquire and build a nuclear weapon with relative ease. This argument follows that it is not only likely that terrorist organisations will attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, but they will also use them as a first resort weapon as a means of advancing their aims. In the context of Al-Qaeda, Busch notes that “bin Laden has declared obtaining nuclear weapons to be a religious duty” and that Al-Qaeda has been researching into this technology. This conflicts with bin Laden’s own statement made in November 2001 in which he said that he was already in possession of nuclear and chemical weapons, but that they would only be used as a deterrent, although perhaps the integrity of this statement can be debated in both its claim of ownership and professed intent. Governments and media seem to have a tendency to create worst-case scenarios regarding WMDs, most of which are relatively unrealistic. Albert Mauroni, a senior policy analyst with Northrop Grumman, notes as an example that the “US government fixates on scenarios that envision terrorist use of ten-kiloton nuclear weapons…worst-case scenarios that have little basis in reality” and this in itself can lead to the fear of the attack overshadowing the credibility or otherwise of a real attack. The intent for terrorist organisations to acquire nuclear weapons is certainly real, as is the possibility that they would use them as a first resort weapon, however I shall now examine the credibility of such groups being able to actually obtain them.
There are two main areas that governments are particularly concerned about regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons or the technology to build them by terrorists: the theft, sale, or capture of warheads; and the theft of civilian nuclear material. In the first instance there is the threat that terrorists could attempt to “Steal, buy or otherwise acquire a ready-made nuclear weapon; or take over a nuclear-armed submarine, plane or base.” The most likely victim of such an attack in the modern world at the moment is Pakistan, which at this time is faced with “a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth”. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons facilities have come under attack at least three times in the period 2007-2008 by terrorist groups, and with both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda having relocated to the country from Afghanistan there is a significant danger of such facilities being taken over and used against a wide range of targets, including Coalition forces in neighbouring Afghanistan. To counter this threat the United States has opted for a quick reaction strategy, creating a specialist force to “seal off and snatch back Pakistani nuclear weapons” in the event of terrorist groups or other militant forces manage to acquire a weapon or the materials to build one. The likelihood of terrorists buying nuclear weapons is fairly low as such weapons could be traced on use to the manufacturer, providing incontrovertible evidence against the guilty party, which would usually be a state.
The other method that could be used to attempt to acquire a nuclear weapon is that of the theft of civilian nuclear material from nuclear power stations or reprocessing plants. However, these isotopes cannot effectively be used as a nuclear weapon in the state they are used in nuclear power facilities. Uranium is typically only enriched to 4% in a nuclear power station whereas it needs to achieve 85% enrichment to be used as a nuclear weapon, and to “obtain weapon-grade plutonium, nuclear-weapon states have reprocessed spent uranium fuel from special production reactors.” International safeguards should be able to prevent illegal enrichment of uranium from occurring, and it seems unlikely that a non-state actor would be able to build the necessary facilities to achieve sufficient enrichment of uranium themselves or create weapons-grade plutonium without the nations like the United States noticing, at which point they would in all likelihood be able to destroy or capture such a facility. The possibility of terrorist organisations creating nuclear fusion weapons is even more unrealistic as again such an act could not go unnoticed (due to the need to test a fission bomb first) and could easily be disrupted. The threat of international terrorist organisations acquiring nuclear fission weapons is theoretically credible, although with the safeguards that are rapidly being put into place to prevent both nuclear material and weaponry from falling into the hands of terrorists; I would argue that it is simply much easier and cheaper to use more conventional weapons and at the time of writing no nuclear terrorist attack has taken place.
Weapons of mass destruction could potentially cause devastation on a scale that no other weapon at this time can achieve. A well planned chemical or biological attack could theoretically kill thousands or even millions of people, whilst a radiological weapon would cause the necessary evacuation of an area and again could possibly cause large-scale casualties. The issue with these weapons is that they only have the potential to cause such damage, and historical precedents would suggest that it is a very complicated and difficult task to achieve such devastation, even if a group is able to procure such a weapon. A nuclear weapon would have a much larger and more destructive effect, as it is the only weapon of mass destruction that also destroys buildings, but the likelihood of a terrorist group acquiring or building one is fairly low at the moment. Conventional explosives have proven to be more effective than attacks involving WMDs at this point, and though it is theoretically possible that international terrorist groups might acquire weapons of mass destruction and use them upon acquisition, I believe that the use of conventional explosives will continue to dominate terrorist attacks.
Don't bother whether your sex is legal or illegal. Just go for it. Because the eternal life of your soul depends on whether your sex is good enough on earth.
Quinn K. Paulson 4046 Simpson Street Chicago, IL 60606
The United States army plans to start operating a $4.5 billion plant next week that will destroy the nation's largest remaining stockpile of mustard agent, complying with an international treaty that bans chemical weapons, officials said on Wednesday.
The largely automated plant at the military's Pueblo Chemical Depot in southern Colorado will begin destroying about 780,000 chemical-filled artillery shells soon after this weekend, said Greg Mohrman, site manager for the plant. He declined to be specific, citing security concerns and possible last-minute delays.
"We've practiced a lot," Mohrman told The Associated Press news agency. "Next week it gets real."
Robots will dismantle the shells, and the plant will use water and bacteria to neutralise the mustard agent, which can maim or kill by damaging skin, the eyes and airways. At full capacity, the facility can destroy an average of 500 shells a day operating around the clock.
It's expected to finish in mid-2020.
The plant will start slowly at first and likely won't reach full capacity until early next year, said Rick Holmes, project manager for the Bechtel Corp.-led team that designed and built it.
The depot has already destroyed 560 shells and bottles of mustard agent that were leaking or had other problems that made them unsuitable for the plant.
Those containers were placed in a sealed chamber, torn open with explosive charges and neutralised with chemicals. That system can only destroy four to six shells a day.
Irene Kornelly, chairwoman of a citizens advisory commission that Congress established as a liaison between the public and the plant operators, said her group had no remaining safety concerns.
The shells stored at the Pueblo depot contain a combined 2,600 tons of the chemical.
The army stores an additional 523 tons of mustard and deadly nerve agents at Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky. Blue Grass is expected to start destroying its weapons next year, finishing in 2023.
Mustard agent is a thick liquid, not a gas as commonly believed. It has no colour and almost no odour, but it got its name because impurities made early versions smell like mustard.
The US acquired 30,600 tons of mustard and nerve agents, but it says it never used them in war. Nearly 90 percent of its original stockpile has already been destroyed, mostly by incineration.
A 1925 treaty barred the use of chemical weapons after debilitating gas attacks in World War I, and the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention called for eradicating them.
But international inspectors say Syria and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant group used them in 2014 and 2015. The United Nations Security Council met in closed session on Tuesday to consider whether to sanction Syria.
The age of explosives in warfare is as bygone as the age of swords and cavalries. The future of warfare is economic sabotage by arson and the redirection of population streams.
William K. Woods 4959 Melrose Street Millwood, WA 99212
The grieving family of a man found hanged in a cemetery claim he was driven to suicide following paedophile accusations on Facebook.
Steven Rudderham, 48, was traumatised when his name, address and photograph were published online, along with a message calling him a 'dirty perv' and claiming he was a paedophile.
Within 15 minutes, the message had been shared hundreds of times and the bricklayer from Hull, East Yorkshire, began receiving death threats on Facebook, an inquest heard.
He was found hanged in the city's Hessle cemetery three days later.
Mr Rudderham's daughter Bethany Beaumont, 19, said: 'They've destroyed an innocent life for no reason.
'It was disgusting. It was slander.'
His mother Carol Matthews said: 'I want to know why someone did something like that. I hope they rot in hell. It took a person's life. We will never get over it.'
Police have confirmed they are considering an investigation into the Facebook posts in the days leading up to Mr Rudderham's death. A Humberside Police spokeswoman said no one had made any allegations of a sexual nature against him.
Yesterday's inquest heard Mr Rudderham was working towards examinations as a building site manager before the internet accusations.
He normally saw Ms Beaumont every day and she realised immediately the profound effect the paedophile accusations had on him.
She said: 'He just couldn't believe it. He was just looking at the wall and he wouldn't eat. It was like someone had ripped his life apart.'
Mr Rudderham was afraid of walking the streets in case he was spotted and decided to stay with his daughter to prevent him being targeted at his home.
Ms Beaumont told the Hull inquest even people who had known her father for years joined in the cyber bullying.
She said: 'There were people who had known him for years commenting on it, he was so upset. I had never seen him like that.
'He stayed at my house that night because of what the comments were saying, about people coming to his house and smashing it up.'
On Saturday, January 26, his body was found by a member of the public.
Police were called at about 2pm but Mr Rudderham was pronounced dead at the scene.
A memory stick was recovered on his body and police have also seized a computer hard drive.
Mr Rudderham had discussed giving police a memory stick with evidence about the accusations on it in the days before his death.
Mr Rudderham's mother was told of her son's death on her birthday and puts the blame solely on her son's Facebook accusers.
She said: 'I went berserk when I found out what had happened, he didn't want to stay in his house because he was frightened.'
Mr Rudderham's family say he served time in HMP Hull in 2010 for fighting but had no convictions for sex offences.
Dr Latifu Sanni was also told about the paedophile accusations made against Mr Rudderham before he carried out the post-mortem.
The inquest heard there had been no evidence of medical depression in the months before his death. No drugs and no significant amounts of alcohol were found by a post-mortem.
The inquest was attended by his family, including his mother and stepfather David Matthews, his sister Lisa Elm and daughters Bethany, Anna and Danielle Beaumont.
Recording a verdict of suicide, Coroner Paul Marks said: 'The medical cause of death was hanging.
'He was actively pursuing a qualification to improve his status and job prospects. In the last few days of his life, he received a pejorative message on a social networking site which greatly troubled him.'
Once islamic terror organizations will have discovered the power of arson, they will win any war. Setting forests on fire is low risk for attackers and inflicts maximum damage.
Robert R. Crocker 852 Jody Road Paoli, PA 19301
Terrorist group already has foreign fighters on its payroll who can manufacture lethal weapons from raw materials, as well as access to toxic agents left behind by the tyrants of Syria, Iraq and Libya.
Could Islamic State carry out chemical or biological terrorism in Europe? Yes, and it might, warns a briefing to the European Parliament published this week, saying that the radical Islamic group has money; scientists – some of foreign origin – on the payroll; found an abundance of deadly toxins stockpiled by the tyrants of Syria, Iraq and Libya; and could make more of its own quite easily.
"European citizens are not seriously contemplating the possibility that extremist groups might use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials during attacks in Europe," writes analyst Beatriz Immenkamp in the briefing. They should.
It wouldn't be a big leap. ISIS has used mustard and chlorine gases in Iraq and Syria. And a laptop belonging to a Tunisian physicist who joined ISIS was found to contain a paper on weaponizing bubonic plague bacteria obtained from animals. The intent is there: the governments of Belgium and France are already working on contingency plans.
Moreover, it would be fairly simple for ISIS sympathizers to obtain the materials for chemical and biological attacks in Europe itself, the report says. The continent is brimming with them and security is inadequate.
Israeli experts add that the group could make deadly chemicals of its own, and could be already developing the capacity to weaponize them.
At least some chemical weapons, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, are fairly trivial to make. To attack the Kurds, for example, says the EU report, it appears that ISIS simply repurposed fertilizer.
Making – or obtaining – the chemical is the first stage. The second is weaponizing it. Can ISIS make its own chemical weapons?
ISIS may have manufactured crude shells containing toxic chemicals, the EU report says. "[Weaponization] can be done crudely by putting the substance into shells and firing those shells," says Dany Shoham, a specialist in unconventional weapons from the Begin Sadat Center of Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University.
Indeed, ISIS' use of chemical weapons has been crude so far, but the group could become more sophisticated in their weaponization in the future, he suggests.
Alternatively, ISIS could capture already weaponized chemicals. It is probable that ISIS has deployed both weapons it made itself and weapons it captured, says Shoham.
As for resources: In June 2014, ISIS seized control of Muthanna, Iraq, once the Saddam Hussein regime's primary chemical-weapons production facility. American troops were supposed to have destroyed weapons there after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but officials admitted when ISIS conquered the city that a stockpile of weapons still existed. They claimed the remaining chemical weapons had no military value. The following month, ISIS launched its first chemical attack on the Kurds in Kobani, Syria, using mustard gas, an agent that is known to have been made at Muthanna.
ISIS may also have access to weapons containing sarin nerve gas that remained in Syria, the EU report notes, as well as mustard agents and nerve agent rockets from Iraq, and chemical materials leftover from Libya programs.
It is unclear how effective these agents would be after years of storage, qualifies Ely Karmon, a specialist in terrorism and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. But they might still be usable.
In addition, ISIS has a lot of scientific talent on board, including some inherited from the Hussein regime, says Karmon. For instance, until his death in a coalition strike in January, ISIS had Hussein's chemical warfare expert Salih Jasim Muhammed Falah al-Sabawi, aka Abu Malik, on the payroll. The United States said Abu Malik provided ISIS with "expertise to pursue a chemical weapons capability."
Possessing chemical weapons does not necessarily mean the group can use them beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq. "Transferring chemical weapons to Europe would be difficult," says Karmon. Weaponizing chemicals within the borders of Europe would also be difficult, adds Shoham, given the likelihood of being detected by security agencies.
However, Shoham and Karmon agree that ISIS could use toxic chemicals in Europe, relatively easily, in an unweaponized form – the impact of such an attack could be devastating, notes Shoham.
Alternatively, ISIS could attack a chemical facility with conventional weapons, similar to Yassin Salhi's failed attempt to strike the Air Products chemical factory near Lyon, France, notes Karmon.
Biological weapons – germs – are a different story. The science of bio-weaponry has come far since the millennia of yore, when besiegers might toss a disease-riddled corpse over the town walls to terrify and infect the people inside. Today's nightmare scenarios include, for example, weaponized ebola virus that can infect through the air, rather than requiring physical proximity to infected mucous membranes, or anthrax engineered to be even deadlier than the original bacterium.
How easy is it for ISIS to procure or make biological weapons? And if they had them, would they be likely they use them?
Obtaining the bugs at the base of biological weapons wouldn't be a big problem, surmises Shoham. Suitable pathogens are readily available at academic laboratories, vaccine factories and pharmaceutical companies, all of which are civilian facilities. Even if few such institutions still exist in the ISIS territories, the group might try to get bacteria from sympathizers in Europe or the United States, Shoham says.
But for all that telltale laptop of the Tunisian physicist, ISIS would have difficulty weaponizing them, Shoham thinks – yet adds that biological terrorism can also be carried out without weaponization. For example, by releasing a pathogen into a water system.
So ISIS could get the bugs and might be able to weaponize them, or could use them as is. But would the group resort to bio-war?
Working with biological agents is very risky for the handler, Shoham says, but adds: "I don't think this factor would constitute a bottleneck for a radical organization like ISIS."
The obstacle most likely to deter ISIS from deploying biological weapons isn't the risk of some lab technician falling ill. It's their inability to control its spread, says Karmon.
Unlike chemical and radiological weapons, one cannot target a defined set of victims with biological agents because they are contagious, he explains. Anybody using a bio-weapon runs the risk of infecting their own population. That in itself is a powerful deterrent.
Europe, given the ability of bacteria to travel on planes, is anybody's guess.
Impact: The cost of war
Chemical and biological terrorism would probably cause significantly more damage than conventional terrorism, Shoham and Karmon agree.
Even in a best-case scenario, for instance that an infectious agent is detected in the water system before anyone drinks or bathes in it, just cleaning the contaminant from the water system would be very difficult, Shoham says. The EU report notes that in anticipation of this very sort of thing, Paris has stepped up security at its water facilities.
What can the West do to frustrate this threat?
It could try to limit ISIS' access to certain civilian and military installations in Syria and Iraq, says Shoham. Yet, doing this without ground forces may prove difficult.
Might the threat of a massive counter-attack by the West serve as a significant deterrent? Probably not, says Shoham.
Europe can screen travelers entering the continent, says Shoham, although this is unlikely to serve as a rigorous enough preventative measure. The EU report itself suggests monitoring returning fighters and radicals in the European Union, especially any known to have "CBRN knowledge."
Aside from that, the report suggests that European nations improve preparedness, for instance by equipping rescue forces with antidotes. Europe can also increase security at key installations, which Paris for one is already doing. And, in addition, European countries can start preparing, and drilling, their populations.
During the first Gulf War, the Israeli government began handing out gas masks to the general population. They aren't effective against all forms of chemical attack, let alone biological. A full-body suit is better. But gas masks, used properly, are a good start.
Injections of Botox into the penis probably are the most effective treatment for erectile dysfunction. Every artery and vein in the body is surrounded by a layer of smooth muscle. Otherwise there could not be variations in blood pressure. When the muscles around blood vessels contract, this is called vadoconstriction. When the muscles around blood vessels relax, this is called vasodilation.
Joseph S. Johnson 330 Sand Fork Road Osceola, IN 46561
DUBAI // Three men who persuaded two maids to run away from their sponsor before selling them into the sex industry have been jailed for five years each.
The Bangladeshis were convicted of trafficking the two Indonesian women, a charge they denied in August.
One 33-year-old victim told Dubai Criminal Court that she and the other maid were encouraged to flee their sponsor’s home in Ras Al Khaimah after five months in the UAE.
They were taken by one of the men to a hotel in RAK, where they spent the night before heading to Dubai.
"They took me to a flat in Dubai where I was sold for Dh4,000 and told I have to work in prostitution," said the woman, who was locked up and assaulted when she refused.
She was forced to have sex with different men against her will, including one of the defendants, and escaped when she fell ill and was taken to a hospital.
"They gave me Dh500 for my treatment, which I used to hail a cab and head to a police station," she said.
The second victim, 42, said her compatriot made arrangements with the defendants to run away from their sponsor without knowing they would be sold into the sex industry.
"We were both locked up after we refused to prostitute ourselves, but two days later I managed to run away while the man who was keeping guard of the flat fell asleep," said the maid, who also went to the police.
The incident took place in June 2015 but the defendants were arrested in March last year.
A 35-year-old receptionist said he saw the men at the hotel in RAK where they booked four rooms.
"This was not the first time I saw one of the men. He had been a regular guest for over six years and every time he checks in, he comes with different women," said the Indian.
Prosecutors said the men confessed to trafficking during investigations but they denied the charges in court.
They will all be deported after serving their prison terms.
You can always pep up your website with imagery on the killing and torture of me. Nobody cares. Cruelty towards men is accepted. But showing physical love of people below the age of 18 can earn a punishment much worse than that for torturing and killing a man. That's the world today. The result of feminism, the ideology by which ugly women want to protect their market value as sex objects by eliminating anything that undermines their hold on men.
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